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The Jewish Mind:
A cognitive science of religion approach to and in Judaism
INTRODUCTION
The cognitive science of religion (CSR) aims at understanding religion as a product 
of the human cognitive system. As Pyysiäinen (2012, p. 6.) puts it: “the main idea is 
to use the tools of cognitive science and cognitive psychology to explore the cognitive 
foundations of religious concepts and beliefs”. 
The human cognitive system can be approached from several angles, and therefore 
CSR also offers a multitude of perspectives to study religion. Religion can be viewed 
either as a cognitive neuroscientific phenomenon, or as mental computation, depending 
on whether we focus on the brain or on the mind. Then, the brain-and-mind complex 
is enlarged into embodied cognition, also implicating other organs of the human orga-
nism; and into embedded cognition, also involving the individual’s physical and social 
environment. Finally, there is a temporal dimension to the study of human cognition: 
enter cultural evolution (including the history of religions) in historical times, and the 
evolutionary history of cognitive functions (comprising religiosity) in pre-historical 
times.
This quick overview of CSR gives one the impression that CSR is inherently a 
materialistic enterprise, explaining how humans created gods, and not how gods cre-
ated humans. One the one hand, this is self-evident, for CSR is a paradigm within the 
academic study of religion: a secular social sciences and humanities discipline, which 
has studied religion for centuries as a phenomenon emerging in history (history of 
religion), in society (sociology of religion) or in one’s psyche (psychology of religion). 
The academic study of religion (and of specific religions) must not be confused with 
theology, which may study very different topics – often pertaining to physics, biology, 
history or ethics – as a denomi nationally informed discipline. Religion is the research 
subject in the former, and the methodology in the latter. Consequently, the theories 
advanced by CSR about how the human brain/mind creates gods and spirits, myths and 
mysticism, rules and rituals, priests and pyramids, have fuelled several authors of New 
Atheism, including Richard Dawkins (2006) and Daniel Dennett (2006).
On the other hand, many scholars in the CSR camp are theologians or otherwise 
believing scholars. “Copernicus claimed cosmology for science, and now the cognitive 
scholars claim the brain for science” – thus explained it to me my good friend, István 
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Czachesz, a Calvinist theologian by training, when he first introduced me to CSR. 
Indeed, Copernicus posed a challenge to the interpretation of Josh 10:12, Darwin posed 
a challenge to Gen 1–2, and Wellhausen to much of the narratives in the Hebrew Bible. 
But CSR does not pose any challenge, for a believing scholar would simply ask what 
kind of mind/brain God had Homo sapiens evolve, so that we can all perceive and 
understand Him.
In my contribution, I shall reverse the table, and pose the question: what can CSR 
contribute to the study and philosophy of Judaism? As we enter the third decade of the 
twenty-first century, sui generis approaches to religion have long belonged to the past. 
Judaism is a religious tradition that emerged and developed in history, which exists 
in certain communities, and which is experienced by certain individuals. It is a his-
torical, sociological and psychological phenomenon; hence, the relevance of cognitive 
approaches. By better understanding the make-up of the human brain, we expect to 
better understand the history, sociology and psychology of Judaism; and vice versa, by 
employing the conceptual tools and research techniques of CSR to Judaism, we hope 
to contribute to the study of the human mind in general.
This paper aims at a postmetaphysical God-talk (cf. Bentley, 2017) to facilitate the 
dialogue between Judaism and science. Informed by CSR, we shall replace ontological 
statements by epistemological ones. Central notions in Jewish theology – such as God, 
revelation, commandments, reward and punishment, purity and impurity, Shabbat and 
holidays, the biblical narratives, the Holy Land, etc. – are viewed as mental represen-
tations in the Jew’s mind, dismissing both positive and negative ontological, historical 
and ethical claims. As explained in the next section, the concept of mental representa-
tions is itself an epistemological tool, without arguing for identifiable neural correlates 
thereof in the brain. In turn, the dialogue shall focus on these representations: on their 
nature, their meaning, their features, as well as on their connections to each other, 
to the believers and to their communities.
RELIGION AS A NETWORK OF MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS 
OF CONCEPTS AND ACTIONS
The key tenet of the cognitive paradigm since its inception has been the computer 
metaphor of the brain (cf. Daugman, 2001). The working hypothesis assumes that our 
mind stores representations of entities and events around us, keeping track of their 
features, properties, histories and interrelations. Religious concepts, narratives and 
rituals are similar pieces of information to be encoded and processed.
The long-standing debate about the nature of the mental representations is hardly 
relevant to us here. Are they symbols, physically realised in the brain? Or perhaps a 
pattern of brain cell activations distributed in space and time? Are other organs of the 
body also involved? Do those representations really “stand for” abstract concepts? 
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These questions are fascinating in general, and they certainly propel novel research on 
lower cognitive functions, which have been studied for many decades. 
However, religion belongs to higher cognition, and its study from a cognitive per-
spective is still in its infancy. Consider linguistics: although the field underwent the 
cognitive turn more than half a century ago, most linguists still develop models with 
symbolic representations, without asking how their theoretical constructs can be repre-
sented in the brain. Therefore, I argue, it is a more successful research strategy to think 
of religious concepts, narratives and rituals in this early phase as some kinds of data 
structures handled by the mental computer. Observed cultural phenomena are first re-
cast as symbolic mental computations, before being gradually turned into algorithms 
implementable on the human wetware (cf. Biró, 2014, and references therein). Sym-
bolic models of religious phenomena are bridge piers that help build the bridge of 
explanation, connecting higher cognition to low-level neural mechanisms.
Thus, religious concepts such as gods, spirits, priests and sacred objects have been 
perceived by CSR as (a peculiar kind of) mental representations of entities. Similarly, 
mythologies and eschatologies, but also rituals are perceived as mental representations 
of events. Independently of the “real world”, a religious person’s mind will entertain 
these representations. A religion is a network of such representations (Czachesz, 2014).
This network connects representations of narratives with the representations of 
deities appearing therein; representations of rituals with the representations of religious 
specialists performing them; representations of sacred spaces with the representations 
of narratives or rituals associated to them; representations of sacred objects with the 
representations of narratives about how and why they work; and so on. Moreover, this 
network is also connected to representations of the self (activating autobiographical 
memories), to representations of social and natural phenomena, of knowledge from 
other domains, and so on. In fact, religion is but a loosely circumscribable subnetwork 
of the network of all mental representations. I concur with many contemporary  scholars 
of religion who argue that religion is a modern Western concept, without precise 
equi valents in pre-modern and non-Western cultures, while the frontier between the 
“religious” and the “non-religious” domains is at best vague.
An essential feature of the subnetwork called religion by the modern Western  scholar 
is that many mental representations therein are culturally postulated. The “epistemo-
logical status” (cf. Biró, 2013a, p. 126.) of a mental representation can be real, or 
culturally postulated, or fictive, or hypothetical, among others. In general, much of our 
learnt knowledge is culturally postulated, including scientific concepts (cf. McCauley, 
2011). For instance, the flow of electricity in a circuit is something you learn about, 
but you cannot observe it directly. A science teacher’s demonstration is grounded on a 
series of culturally postulated ideas and axioms, to be accepted by the pupils. Members 
of a specific culture assume these ideas and axioms have been verified by earlier mem-
bers of the culture. In fact, there is an evolutionary advantage to accepting prior knowl-
edge from elders and peers without undergoing (at times, hazardous, and at times, 
unpleasant) personal experience (Biró, 2011, p. 172.). Subsequently, new situations 
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will repeatedly corroborate this culturally postulated network of ideas and axioms. Thus 
emerges a culturally postulated framework (scientific or religious) that help members 
of the culture in interpreting the world. At the same time, a comparison to other cultures 
reveals the cultural constructedness of this framework.
Certain mental representations are shared by all (healthy adult) members of the 
Homo sapiens species. The epistemological status real could be a shorthand for this 
case. Being unable to check all humans, however, the observer will simply compare 
his or her perception to the representations found in the observed culture. But the dis-
tinction between real and culturally postulated is not simply a judgement made by the 
outsider. The distinction also influences how members of the culture process these 
representations.
A wonderful example is provided by Lawson and McCauley (1990, p. 12.): “Why 
do the Dorze of Ethiopia say that the leopard is a Christian animal which observes the 
fast days of the Orthodox church while protecting their goats from marauding leopards 
on those same fast days?” A Jewish version of this question from 2020: how did the 
two strategies to cope with the pandemic – the religious strategy (including communal 
prayers and Torah study) and the scientific strategy (physical distancing) – relate to 
each other? And why will the failure of the former not weaken religiosity among or-
thodox Jews?
In general, why can the culturally postulated subnetwork be often replaced tempo-
rarily by a real (“more scientific”) subnetwork, without being displaced permanently? 
How can seemingly contradicting mental subnetworks co-exist? This is the most fas-
cinating question, I believe, for any cognitive approach to religion. 
The next section poses similar questions to the liberal and scientifically minded 
rabbi.
LIBERAL THEOLOGY, SCIENCE AND MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS
Religious mental representations are, consequently, culturally postulated. This state-
ment reconciles the emic perspective of the theologians with the etic perspective of the 
scholars of religions. The former are entitled to adhere to the truth of their own cul- 
turally postulated mental representations, and at the same time, admit cross-cultural 
variations. Like Lessing’s Nathan the Wise in the Ring Parable, an open-minded theolo-
gian accepts both his or her own emic truth, and other theologians’ beliefs. 
No cognitive dissonance occurs. My culturally postulated representations belong to 
a network of representations that includes me, as well as my feelings, my knowledge 
and my personal experiences. Upon reflection, I obtain a second order representation 
of my culturally postulated representations embedded into this network, that is, my 
re ligion. (Remember that a religion is a network of culturally postulated representa-
tions.) Yet, I entertain others’ beliefs differently: as second order representations about 
those beliefs belonging to other people. Comparing these second order representations, 
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I conclude that those beliefs belong to those people, exactly like my beliefs belong 
to me. 
Science is yet another network of representations. For instance, I may hold a per-
sonal narrative about the Israelites’ exodus from Egypt, strongly embedded into a 
cultural and religious network of narratives, precepts, rituals, personal experiences, and 
so on. I remember the Seder night last year with my family, on the first day of Passover, 
when the Biblical narratives were retold to my children in a specific way… Simultane-
ously, I may also acknowledge that it is “only” a culturally postulated narrative, and 
evaluated as untrue in a different subnetwork, that of historiography. This second sub-
network contains the representations of different concepts and methodological axioms, 
bringing about different narratives in my mind (according to which the Exodus is only 
a legend). Importantly, both subnetworks are also connected to the representation my 
mind entertains about myself. Yet, these subnetworks activate different aspects (“iden-
tities”) of the self (myself as a Jew, and myself as a scholar), which are associated to 
different autobiographical memories (representations of narratives), to different social 
contexts (representations of social relations), to different behavioural patterns (repre-
sentations of normative actions), and so on.
The tension between scientific (philosophical) truth and revealed (religious) truth 
has been a central question for philosophers of religions since the Middle Ages. While 
the myriads of different solutions proposed cannot and need not be repeated here (for 
an overview in Jewish context, refer to Rosenberg, 2015), I suggest considering CSR 
as a tool for reformulating some of the past answers. 
The approach just proposed focuses on the thinker’s thinking processes (cognition 
in its old sense): the scientific and the religious worldviews are separate (even if at 
times overlapping) subnetworks of mental representations. Cognitive dissonance can 
be avoided and a duplex veritas state-of-mind can be maintained if the two subnetworks 
are indeed associated to separate identities of the self, and if they are activated in dif-
ferent social contexts (such as in the congregation and in the academia). The concept 
of objective truth is put in parentheses, but not rejected – after all, mental representa-
tions should (or aim to, or are meant to) represent something in the outside world, even 
if they do not do so necessarily. On the long term, neuroscience shall help us understand 
how and why a religious thinker entertains those scientific representations along with 
those religious representations of the world.
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TEXTS AND CULTURALLY POSTULATED NARRATIVES
The foundational act, the key narrative of rabbinic Judaism is laid down in the Mishnah:1
Moses received the Law from Sinai and committed it to Joshua, and Joshua to 
the elders, and the elders to the Prophets; and the Prophets committed it to the 
men of the Great Synagogue (…) (Mishnah Avot 1,1)
The foundational act is a giving-receiving action: matan Tora in Hebrew, the ‘giving 
of the Torah’. The mental representation of this action involves a verb with three argu-
ments (roles): the giver (subject or agent/source), the given (direct object or patient) 
and the givee (indirect object or recipient/target). From the perspective of a postmeta-
physical God-talk (cf. Bentley, 2017), it is significant that the quotation does not con-
tain a reference to the agent. A possible interpretation of this surprising fact is that the 
source of the Law could be left out from the system. 
Rabbinical Judaism is based on the interpretation of the Law, and it focuses on its 
ritual enactment; therefore, one might think, the source of the Law must naturally ap-
pear in a prominent position. Naturally is a pun in the previous sentence, referring to 
the title of the book of Robert McCauley (2011). Indeed, the intuitive religious system 
– the network of religious mental representations – by most observant Jews includes 
some representation of God: a superhuman agent that fills the subject (agent/source) 
role of the matan Tora action. The same representation also develops many more con-
nections to other culturally postulated representations – typically, to narratives, while 
its connections to rituals are at best indirect [causing a problem for mainstream CSR 
approaches to rituals (cf. Biró, 2013a; 2013b)]. It is hence natural, cognitively optimal 
to include a culturally postulated supernatural agent into the system.
However, Avot 1,1 hints to the possibility of a rabbinical Jewish system without 
such a representation. It would be fascinating to explore the prospects of a system that 
lacks the supernatural and takes the Torah received by Moses as its starting point.
In this quotation, the Law, or the Torah, is not specified. It was handed down from 
Moses via the key figures of the biblical period to – as described in the rest of chapter 1 
of Avot – the rabbis. This is the foundational narrative of rabbinical Judaism. Impor-
tantly, Moses did not simply receive the two tablets and the Ten Commandments, but 
much more: the full text of the Pentateuch, together with a body of oral teachings.2 For 
Pharisaic, later, rabbinic Judaism, the Oral Law is a complex body of explicit and 
implicit knowledge, information, difficult to define and to delineate, which simultane-
ously explains and complements the Written Law, the five books of Moses.
1 Translation by Herbert Danby (The Mishnah, 1933 [1950], p. 446.).
2 While the text of the Mishnah does not make it clear, the word tora is universally understood as refer-
ring to the Oral Law (tora she-be-al-pe). Cf. Danby’s footnote ad loc. Cf. Maimonides’ introduction to his 
Mishneh Torah.
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Knowledge and information are very abstract concepts. Instead, the foundational 
narrative of rabbinical Judaism posits that Moses was verbally communicated all pos-
sible teachings that can be voiced in accordance with the Torah. Quoting one of the 
most famous formulations thereof (based on a midrashic exegesis of Deut 9:10 and 
Eccl 1:10):
[Moses was given] the Scriptures, the traditional law, the oral legal teachings 
and the homiletic explanations. Even that which a senior student will ever ex-
pound in front of his master was already told to Moses on Sinai. (Jerusalem 
Talmud Peah 2:4, 13a; similar found in Lev. Rabbah Aharei Mot 22, and in 
parallel sources elsewhere)
Thus, the Law becomes text: either written, or orally transmitted, either already known, 
or yet to be penned or uttered. Note how an abstract concept (law, knowledge, informa-
tion) is decomposed into simpler mental representations: specific texts of the rabbinical 
literature, as well as an indefinite series of past and future actions (tiny narratives). 
Hereby any past and future rabbinic teaching and enouncement becomes normative, 
as it was already revealed to Moses on Sinai. An observant Jew must behave accord-
ingly. In other words: the mental representation of one’s behaviour must align with the 
mental representations of the enouncements in those tiny narratives.
Hereby emerges the idea of the divinely sanctioned interpretation of the Bible, which 
is transmitted to and by the rabbis. Historically, this narrative served to legitimise the 
rabbinical tradition challenged by contemporaneous rival groups. The Sadducees, the 
Essenes, the Samaritans, the Gnostics and the Christians, later the Karaites and many 
other streams produced their own exegeses of the Bible. Yet, the rabbinical tradition 
goes further: not only the correct reading of the plain text is authorised, but also a broad 
range of ritual practices, laws and customs, as well as para-biblical stories and theo-
logical statements, which do not appear verbatim in the text on the Torah scroll, but 
are postulated to originate at Mount Sinai. 
By accepting the above narrative, a community is created, which is an interpretive 
community and a ritual community at the same time, delineating themselves from 
other communities. Here enters social cognition. As Christine Hayes put it: “At the 
heart of the rabbinic self-understanding lies a text. A rabbi is one who devotes himself 
to this text and associated traditions of learning and practice as developed by the class 
of sages” (Hayes, 2007, p. 262). In the course of the first millennium CE, Judaism 
became dominated by this class.
Judaism thus emerged as a mental network of texts (the Bible, the Mishnah, etc.), 
of narratives (about Moses, about past rabbis, about future rabbis, about me learning 
those texts), of persons (Moses, past rabbis, me and my rabbi, my community) and of 
actions (normative actions and my concrete actions) – as well as the interaction of all 
these mental representations.
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THE MIND OF THE HALAKHIC MAN
In his books, Halakhic Man (Soloveitchik, 1983) and The Halakhic Mind (Soloveitchik, 
1986), Joseph B. Soloveitchik, an important rabbi and original orthodox Jewish  thinker 
in the twentieth century, a scion of a leading family of Lithuanian Talmudists,  developed 
a “mitnagged phenomenology” [a term suggested by Eugene Borowitz (Soloveitchik, 
1983, p. vii)]. He adopted the notion of homo religiosus from Kierkegaard, Karl Barth 
and Rudolf Otto, and contrasted it to the cognitive man, before adding a third prototype 
to the picture: the halakhic man. These three prototypes represent three aspects of 
human (or Jewish) existence. Beside the numinous and the rational, he describes a third 
kind of experience, that of the Jewish law (halakha). 
For Soloveitchik (1983, p. 17), “[h]alakhic man differs in his world view from the 
universal homo religiosus. He resembles in various ways cognitive man, yet, he differs 
in many respects from him as well.” The halakhic man lacks the esoteric attitude of the 
homo religiosus: “Halakhic man’s approach to reality is, at the outset, devoid of any 
element of transcendence”. Similarly to the cognitive man, the halakhic man tries to 
grasp reality, instead of praising the ungraspable character of the world. Nonetheless: 
“When halakhic man approaches reality, he comes with his Torah, given to him from 
Sinai, in hand. He orients himself to the world by means of fixed statutes and firm 
principles. An entire corpus of precepts and laws guides him along the path leading to 
existence” (p. 19.). Moreover, “halakhic man prefers the real world to a transcendent 
existence because here, in this world, man is given the opportunity to create, act, ac-
complish, while there, in the world to come, he is powerless to change anything at all” 
(Soloveitchik, 1983, p. 32.). This prototype is illustrated by Soloveitchik’s own family, 
most notably by his grandfather, Haim Soloveitchik, “the Brisker rebbe”, the founder 
of a novel analytical approach to Talmudic study.
Transposing Soloveitchik’s phenomenology into a CSR perspective, we can view 
Talmudic-legalistic Judaism as a mental toolbox for cognising the world, and for 
operating therein. Yet, halakha is a revealed conceptual framework, “given to him from 
Sinai”, unlike the man-made toolbox of the cognitive man. For instance, time is mea- 
sured not by astronomical considerations, but for ritual purposes. The units employed 
for measuring length, weight and volume are not defined by some human authority, 
but by the authority of the tradition, which relates that these were given to Moses on 
Sinai. Legal concepts in family law and private law arise not from tradition, ethical 
considerations or common sense, but from biblical exegesis. Similarly, history is also 
interpreted in terms of biblical antecedents. The Torah revealed at Sinai is thus the 
conceptual framework at the disposal of the halakhic man offering him or her “the 
opportunity to create, act, accomplish” in this world. In CSR terms, this is a set of 
culturally postulated mental representations closely associated to the narrative of the 
revelation.
The three prototypes of Soloveitchik are best understood as three modes of human 
functioning, or as three aspects of the human existence. A given person does not belong 
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to a single type, but rather combines them. The prototypes described by Soloveitchik 
only emerge in extreme cases. Some people, some contexts, some rituals, some literary 
genres and some religious streams may accentuate some aspects rather than other ones; 
that is, the proportions can vary across various phenomena in Judaism. 
As suggested earlier, a person would entertain both “real” and culturally postulated 
mental representations. These are organised into concurrent subnetworks, which in turn 
might offer alternative solutions to problems such as marauding leopards or COVID-19. 
Which of them is active when a decision is actually made? In Soloveitchik’s terms: 
what are the roles of the cognitive man in a person’s life, and which are the situations 
that prefer the halakhic man (a special rabbinic case of the culturally postulated reli-
gious subnetwork)? These are probably the most intriguing questions in CSR.
Let us not forget about the homo religiosus, either. The cognitive mechanisms un-
derlying this aspect of human existence have been another main topic in the cognitive 
science and neuroscience of religion. Emotions are also cognitive phenomena in the 
sense that they are regulated by the brain and strongly interfere with other cognitive 
functions (cf. e.g., Damasio, 2003). They undoubtedly play an important role in the 
mental network of Judaism (Biró, 2013b). The details are still unclear, though.
According to the Mishnah (Avot 2,15–16), “rabbi Tarfon said: the day is short, and 
the work is plentiful…”; but he also used to say: “it is not your duty to finish the work, 
but neither are you at liberty to neglect it.” So do I believe. There is still a long way to 
go to understand the mental mechanisms underlying religion, and in particular, homo 
religious. We may stop for a moment and wonder how mysterious and awe-inspiring 
the religious mind is. But we must remember that we are primarily scientists, cognitive 
men and women, striving to understand as much as we can.
* * *
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